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In this paper, we have distinguished three different positions along the reform strategy spectrum of 
company law. The first position is located on the left side of the spectrum and closest to stasis - 
where virtually no effective legal changes can occur and where only the idea of reform clashes with 
legal tradition and standardization pressures. An example of a jurisdiction that takes this position is 
Germany. Along or near the mid-point of the spectrum, company law changes are less impeded by 
tradition and standardization factors, but more influenced by interest group pressures. We see 
England occupying this position. Japan can be seen as a more adaptable jurisdiction located toward 
the right end of the spectrum and therefore better able to create and introduce more functional legal 
rules and institutions that turn the traditional view of company law around. It is submitted that 
Singapore is located on the right side of the spectrum as its legislature is aware of the need to adapt 
the legal system to international business practices in order to develop a distinct jurisprudence, 
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Ideally, new company law vehicles are the result of legislative processes that are initiated for the 
most part to create mechanisms designed to reduce agency costs and satisfy the contracting interests 
of business parties, such as investors, firm founders and joint venture partners (Kraakman et al. 
2004). The voluminous literature on law and society explains that lawmakers are public regarding 
actors who will identify which rules are efficient across different firms and time, and replace 
inefficient rules accordingly. Thus conceived, the ideal and actual function of lawmaking is to 
attempt to increase social welfare by correcting market failures. Lawmakers supposedly regulate 
company forms in the public interest.
1  
Criticism of this public interest theory of lawmaking has largely focused on two shortcomings. 
First, legislation is not primarily the result of efficiency considerations. Second, despite similar 
external market pressures, differences in company law forms continue to persist. Even though there 
have been recent instances of formal legal convergence, current lawmaking procedures and 
pre-existing conditions tend to lock the evolution of company law structures into a particular path, 
thereby maintaining diversity between individual jurisdictions.
2  
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that competitive pressures induce lawmakers to 
adopt the company law rules that are value-increasing. Under these circumstances, lawmakers, eager 
to please investors and other businesses parties, identify practices seen as enhancing firms’ economic 
performance, will introduce company law reforms that have the potential to be more cost-effective, 
and suitably adapted to firms’ changing business needs. Firms and their internal participants are 
viewed as consumers in a market for company law, in which lawmakers seek to design a predictable 
legal product that reduces firms’ costs (Romano 1993).   
Consequently, as national boundaries are of diminishing significance, the cross-fertilization of 
legal concepts is not so much a choice as it is a necessity. In many countries there is a revival of 
interest in company law reform projects and the introduction of new hybrid governance structures 
that presumptively could lead to formal convergence, as reform projects spread around the world 
through a combination of outright borrowing and more subtle imitation. Due largely to the 
worldwide development of the Internet, it is relatively easy for lawmakers to take notice of foreign 
legal business forms that have already been tried and tested in a legal system with similar business, 
social and political dimensions. If we take this a step further, the drive toward new company law at 
all business levels could eventually lead to more efficiency as countries adopt rules and institutions 
representing the best possible outcome. This theory is based on the premise that unless a country’s 
lawmakers consider foreign legislative approaches and solutions, the domestic economy will fall 
behind its competitors.   
Indeed, as the influence of ‘legal transplants’ from the United States is increasingly felt in 
company law reform projects in both Europe and Asia, it might be expected that non-US 
jurisdictions will eventually display similar patterns of legal evolution as we currently see in the 
United States. For instance, the last decade has witnessed the rise of new legal entities and US 
transplants in countries that represent both common law and civil law traditions. In the United 
Kingdom, the promulgation of the limited liability partnership (LLP) was prompted by competition 
from offshore LLP statutes, particularly in the case of Jersey, where Price Waterhouse and Ernst & 
Young promoted new legislation based on a similar law enacted in State of Delaware. The 
                                                      
1    This view corresponds to the ‘public interest theory’. The public interest paradigm of lawmaking emphasizes the 
government’s role in correcting market imperfections such as monopoly pricing and pollution (Laffont and Tirole 
1993, 475). 
2    Gilson (2001) distinguishes between functional convergence (when existing institutions are flexible enough to 
respond to the demands of changed circumstances without altering institutions’ formal characteristics) and formal 
convergence resulting in legislative action necessary to alter the existing institutions.   Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which was directly involved in the introduction of the LLP 
in the United Kingdom, did not, however, just adopt the US LLP – which simply added the limited 
liability feature to its general partnership law provisions. Ultimately, the DTI created a standalone, 
hybrid company form that is situated between a partnership and a corporation.   
Similarly, the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005, inspired by the Delaware LLP, came into 
effect on 11 April 2005 in Singapore. The Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework 
Committee (CFRFC) spurred the introduction of an LLP in Singapore in order to expand the 
governance options to be considered by small- and medium-sized businesses, professionals and 
investment funds. Importantly, Japan, which has a tradition to follow Germany’s company law 
model, has recently been inspired by the success of legal innovation in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, resulting in the introduction of two new legal forms: the LLP 
(yugensekinin-jigyo-kumiai) and LLC (godo-kaisha). These hybrid entities, which are intended to 
supply Japanese firms with more contractual flexibility, are arguably more suitable for firms 
involved in multinational joint ventures in the human capital intensive and financial services sectors.   
As politicians and business groups across Asia reflect on the changes in Japanese company law, 
which are seen as offering organizational advantages to firms in knowledge intensive industries, 
lawmakers in other Asian competitive countries, such as India and China, are already sequencing 
reforms that will lead to the introduction of the LLP. To the extent that India, for example, is a 
latecomer in adopting LLP legislation, the delay seems to have provided opportunities for lawmakers 
to learn from the tried and tested experiences in other jurisdictions. Efforts to improve on the LLP 
structure, based on learning outcomes in other countries, may well benefit Indian professional firms, 
who are increasingly involved in international transactions, by giving them a business form that is 
adaptive to their competitive and litigious environment. The reform is seen as desirable, moreover, 
as it can help induce the introduction of more business startups. Similar arguments are used to the 
same effect by the Chinese Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which already 
adopted major revisions to China’s company law on 27 October 2005, including the introduction of 
one-person companies, lower capital requirements,
3 improved information rights and other 
corporate governance techniques. This laid the basis for China’s top legislature to open the 
discussion, in April 2006, on introducing LLPs in order to stimulate venture capital investment and 
create a level-playing field to facilitate a competitive advantage for Chinese professional firms that 
increasingly operate in the global market. Importantly, the type of reforms proposed in Asia point to 
significant inherent benefits in terms of increased flexibility for the firms that adopt new hybrid legal 
forms. As they are cheaply available and combine the best of the partnership and corporate world, 
these flexible legal forms contain features that make them better suited to professional firms, startups, 
small family firms, and financial funds.   
These developments suggest that there may be significant benefits for businesses and investors in 
jurisdiction that make available more productive business forms. Why do we not see a proliferation 
of new hybrid business forms in continental Europe? After all, the European Court of Justice 
decisions in the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art only recently set in train the basis for the 
cross-border movement of administrative headquarters and the migration of new firms to more 
favourable jurisdictions. The ECJ case law has improved corporate mobility dramatically as a large 
number of continental European privately held firms have been influenced, by the absence of 
minimum capital requirements, to incorporate in the UK as limited companies (Becht et al. 2005). 
We have to keep in mind, however, that those European firms incorporating in the UK are mostly 
‘round-trippers’, which means that a large percentage of businesses in continental Europe could 
benefit directly from the development of more efficient hybrid entities in their own jurisdiction. But, 
they need a coalition of groups to crack open the policymaking agenda and induce national 
                                                      
3  For limited liability companies, the minimum capital has been decreased from RMB 100,000 to RMB 30,000 
(approx. US$ 3,750). A one-person company could be set up with a minimum capital of approx. US$ 12,500. legislatures to introduce new limited liability vehicles. These reasons may be enough to explain that 
the impact of the ECJ’s decisions has only led to patching-up initiatives in most Member States, 
influencing some legislatures to eliminate or reduce minimum capital for private companies. As a 
consequence, the demand for upgraded company law unhindered by capital maintenance 
requirements is relatively high across the European Union, while the introduction of new hybrid 
business forms is mainly viewed as unnecessary since they contribute to increased costs attributed 
mainly to transition issues and enhanced choice (Freedman 1999). 
As we will see in section 2 of this paper, there are three main implications for a theory of legal 
evolution that significantly shape the landscape of and influence the debate on company law reforms. 
First, the predominance of particular legal elites or traditions in the field of company law restricts the 
evolution of the law rather than enhancing its development.
4 Second, the standardization of legal 
business forms confers large increasing returns benefits to the users and their legal advisers, 
arguably limiting the development of modern innovative business forms. Most legal advisers tend to 
rely on standard legal rules, which reduce costs as most parties are familiar with them, irrespective 
of the cumbersome and inefficient nature of many of the standard statutory provisions. Proponents of 
traditional rules argue that, even if a firm has additional incentives to use an innovative legal form, 
they are generally unlikely to select the vehicle, despite its potential, due to the lack of certainty 
about its legal provisions. Third, startup and smaller firms have considerable financial and 
organizational constraints that do not allow them to influence the legislature to adopt business form 
statutes that match their needs. Even if the existing menu of business forms imposes considerable 
costs on firms which are required to either comply with highly formalistic and technical regulations 
or contract around obsolete provisions, these firms are usually not able to run up against the presence 
of concentrated interest groups defending the status quo. Hence, even if incentives to overhaul 
company law are clearly present, the reform process is reinforced by sources of path dependence that 
inhibit the evolution of innovative legal business forms.   
Nevertheless, if we compare and weigh up the competing interests on the supply and demand 
sides of legislation, we cannot predict with certitude the effects of path dependence on legal change 
in a particular jurisdiction. The outcome will depend largely on the effect that each interest has on 
the evolutionary process. If certain pressures are not present in a jurisdiction, or are mitigated by 
unspecified reactions and forces, the influence of path dependence factors on business forms is likely 
to be commensurately weaker. The application of the idea of path dependence to law shows that 
legal institutions evolve along a historical path and can therefore become locked-in and resistant to 
change. In turn, this inflexibility often leads to inefficiencies, as legal rules fail to respond to changes 
in the underlying social and economic conditions. 
That is not to say that new hybrid business forms provide efficient and all-encompassing 
governance frameworks and solutions, but they arguably can play a pivotal role in transaction 
planning and cooperative bargaining among business participants. Opponents to new legal forms 
attempt to frustrate and ridicule the need of new company law. One common view is that a firm can 
tinker with the existing legal framework by simply adjusting the statutory provisions or combining 
existing legal forms to a structure that is responsive to its needs. The balance of evidence suggests, 
however, that substantially modifying the company law statutes involves significant costs (e.g., 
increased information costs and uncertainty, distortions in the signalling function of business forms, 
decreased coherence of terms, erroneous gap-filling by courts and other negative spill-over effects) 
that outweigh possible benefits. In this paper, we show how new separate business statutes are or 
should be more efficient in providing firms, at different levels, with a legal structure that does not 
impose burdens or create distortions and, hence, would have significant cost advantages.   
                                                      
4  Clark (1989) distinguishes among three approaches to lawmaking: (1) contractual rule-making, (2) elite 
rule-making, and (3) traditional rule-making. Indeed, the introduction of new hybrid business forms indicates that contractual rule-making 
sometimes prevails over so-called elite and traditional rule-making (Clark 1989). For this reason, we 
argue that devising new and separate company law forms is more efficient as they offer distinct sets 
of rules and norms that a variety of businesses would have bargained for in a costless world. 
Moreover, a separate set of legal arrangements has substantial contracting benefits for the firm’s 
participants by allowing them to define their expectations ex ante – less hindered by existing 
doctrines and traditions – and, hence, assist judiciaries in solving governance problems and other 
conflicts ex post. As a matter of fact, practicing lawyers and business advisors appear to be willing to 
embrace new company law convinced that from both a tax and business perspective hybrid business 
forms obtain the most efficient result. Section 3 provides empirical evidence for the popularity and 
effectiveness of new legal products in the United States, Europe and Asia. It seems that the selection 
of legal entities requires balancing limited liability protection against, on the one hand, tax benefits 
and, on the other hand, contractual freedom to organize and structure the firm. Empirical research 
from the United States confirms the importance of forms that combine limited liability with 
partnership-type taxation and flexibility. The recent developments in Asia suggest that lawmakers 
and academics cannot afford to remain in denial of the fact that the ‘new company law’ will 
eventually prevail over the existing partnership and corporate forms. Section 4 concludes.   
2.  THE PRODUCTION OF ‘NEW COMPANY LAW’: THREE 
REFORM STRATEGIES 
This section introduces three lawmaking strategies that are often deployed by policymakers in 
company law reform projects. The first strategy involves legislative and political processes that 
result in a mere updating of the existing company law statute. It is predicted that, in general, 
lawmakers are not likely to engage in innovative rule-making, but will supply only a superficial 
‘upgrade’ in the existing legal product range. As this strategy is motivated by concerns to mimic 
results achieved by reforms to business forms in other competitive jurisdictions, as witnessed in 
continental Europe, these revisions are not likely to implicate the interests of the controlling elites 
and interest groups. A second strategy, involving the introduction of a new business form explicitly 
linked to the traditional company law framework can lead to genuine change that will increase the 
overall quality of law for firms generally. As will be discussed, the difference between the first and 
second strategy is that the reforms yielded by the latter strategy may hold out potential costs savings 
for several classes of firms. Finally, the third strategy is moved by exogenous and interest groups 
pressures with the effect of the promulgation of a new innovative legal statute. It is important to 
recognize that jurisdictions can use any combination of the above-referred strategies when 
considering reforms, and that there may be additional incentives not mentioned above that motivate 
legislative outcomes.   
Rather than making a strict distinction between the different reform strategies, that could be used 
to explain the multiple paths of company law development, this section argues that reform measures 
undertaken by national level governments are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible reform 
paths. It ranges from countries that belong to a strong legal tradition that curb deviations from the 
existing regime via countries with weakly organized centralized governments and strong organized 
pressure groups that break down the resistance to legislative change to competitive and 
entrepreneurial jurisdictions that attempt to offer an up-to-date legal product range. On the one end 
of the spectrum, reformers find it difficult to make changes due to the high switching costs and 
institutional rules and political mechanisms that effectively define and control the items on the 
legislative reform agenda. On the other side of the spectrum, there is the presence of incentives to 
innovate and the type of institutional infrastructure under which we can expect pressure groups to have agenda-setting powers may well explain the result of new company forms. Illustrations of 
recent national company law reforms allow us to see how the trajectory of trends tends to map on to 
the spectrum of legal reform. 
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2.1  The First Strategy: ‘Patching-up’ Revisions 
The first strategy only leads to legal upgrades leaving the core of the company law system untouched. 
In this part, we seek to understand the variations in national legal rules and structures that are 
responsible for the persistence of inefficient company law rules and structures that policymakers 
cannot simply alter. It seems that the inferior outcome could largely be explained by strong path 
dependence factors, such as the influence of legal elites and traditions, and the effect of increasing 
returns on the lawmaking process. Naturally there are varying degrees of path dependence which are 
reflected in the diversity of recent company law developments. However, in terms of generalization, 
strong path dependence is a common phenomenon in legal systems that are dominated by legal elites 
and traditions bereft of the ‘law-as-a-product’ dimension. Ironically, if legal products – like regular 
products – gain popularity and expand utilization, increasing returns can magnify the benefits of 
defending the status quo, resulting in a similar evolution pattern. This partly explains why European 
jurisdictions are still loath to overhaul their company laws even though the ECJ, as noted above, has 
opened the door toward a market for company law products After a short discussion about what 
causes the strong path dependence, the paper will turn to introduce factors that have proven to be 
effective in changing the company law reform path. 
2.1.1  Elites and Traditions in Company Law 
In this part we show how lawmakers traditionally shape and structure the company law reform 
process. It is submitted that legislators, judges, practitioners, regulatory agencies, professional 
groups and legal scholars constitute an elite lawmaking group that is responsible for interpreting, 
preserving and developing the law (Watson 1985). These legal professionals produce different kinds 
of texts, such as statutes, judicial decisions and scholarly writings, which one school of comparative 
law academics calls ‘legal formants’ (Sacco 1991; Monateri and Sacco 1998).
5 The law does not 
consist solely of these texts, but should instead be viewed as a series of formulations that 
complement each other (Schlesinger et al. 1998). Still the law and its evolution appears more like a 
battleground on which lawmaking elites compete for hegemony than a system of checks and 
balances (Bourdieu 1987).   
What are the factors that tend to reinforce legal rules and institutions that are in place? Generally, 
there are two factors which operate to make law conservative. First, the lawmaking elite treats the 
                                                      
5  The theory of legal formants, as suggested by Rodolfo Sacco, views the law as a social activity in which 
lawmaking elites compete to provide legal doctrines. 
strong path dependence      
       weak 
path dependence 
ll l i ddi i f idd ilaw as existing in its own right. In this view, the law is largely autonomous and operates in its own 
sphere (Kelsen 1967). As one commentator puts it: ‘the means of creating law, the sources of law, 
come to be regarded as a given, almost as something sacrosanct, and change in these even when they 
are obviously deeply flawed is extremely difficult to achieve’ (Watson 1985). Second, the law is 
justified in its own terms. Lawmakers, i.e., persons trained in law and nothing else, search for the 
legitimacy of legal change, which makes the law typically backward-looking. To a large extent, this 
insulates legal evolution from social and economic change and it therefore displays a serious degree 
of path dependence.   
To what extent does the evolution of the legal rules and institutions reflect social and economic 
change? Lawmakers, who genuinely disagree as to which rules and institutions are ‘best’ (Bebchuk 
and Roe 1999), could be viewed as legal elites that produce competing legal formants. It is possible 
to distinguish between conservative and reform-minded legal elites. Because the law is viewed as 
autonomous, lawmakers historically employ two strategies when entering the competitive arena of 
legal reform. On the one hand, conservative lawmakers deploy the existing legal doctrines, 
principles and culture to protect the status quo and thwart reform. On the other hand, reform-minded 
lawmakers traditionally make reference to foreign rules and institutions to propose legal change and 
to induce the controlling elite of the receiving system to believe that the offered model meets their 
expectations (Watson 1974).   
If we take this a step further, it could be argued that the development of the law takes place 
mainly by transplantation of legal rules. Yet in order to be effective, a borrowed legal rule or 
institution must be understood and appreciated by the dominant, and usually conservative, 
lawmaking elite. Indeed, it is submitted that a legal transplant increases its own receptivity when 
adaptations to the domestic formal and informal legal order are made or the borrower is already 
familiar with basic legal principles of the donor jurisdiction (Berkowitz et al. 2003). 
It is in the legal actors’ nature to attach considerable importance to authority in the transplanting 
process. It is often very difficult for a law reformer to ‘sell’ his ideas without the support of some 
kind of authority whose expertise is widely recognized by the legal community (Sacco 1991).
6 That 
authority could be inherent in a foreign legal system or institution due to its prestige, common legal 
tradition or high accessibility. Reform-minded lawmakers attempt to convince the controlling elite 
that borrowing should occur by juxtaposing black-letter law reports, and consulting intuition and any 
available facts to show the foreign legal system’s supremacy (Ogus 1998, Fanto 2002).
7 Yet, the 
results of comparative legal studies often lack a clear theoretical or empirical explanation of why a 
particular foreign system or institution is the most suitable model, given the needs of the social and 
economic environment. When legal parochialism is strong and jurisdictions are largely resistant to 
transplants (which is often the case where jurisdictions are convinced of the effectiveness of their 
own legal system), reform-minded elites adopt a different strategy. They deny the fact that a model 
is borrowed, and use local authority to bolster their opinion (Mattei 1994). In this view, legal change 
could be explained largely by ‘hidden’ transplants, which are a mixture of foreign and indigenous 
doctrines and principles (Horowitz 1994). 
However, it might be argued that if a jurisdiction becomes part of a common market like the 
United States or the European Union, convergence of important principles of company law is likely 
to become greater, as the number of firms that not only do business in more than one state, but have 
among their members residents of different states, increases. In this context, national level company 
law reforms in the European Union (EU) have been encouraged by changes in European Court of 
                                                      
6    Sacco (1991) argues that a legal innovation that does not originate from an authority is often viewed as an ‘error’. 
7  Prestige seems to be the key word. As a consequence, ‘it is unlikely that a European country will imitate an 
African model, that the United States will imitate a Venezuelan model, that the Scandinavian countries will 
imitate an Italian model, and so forth’ (Sacco 1991). Fanto (2002) gives an analysis of psychological factors used 
by reform-minded lawmakers to make a persuasive case for reform. Justice (ECJ) case law, which have encouraged firm mobility for startups, giving reform-minded 
lawmakers an incentive to intensify their efforts to modernize their domestic company laws.
8 But,  as 
noted earlier, the dominant reform strategy of most national level policymakers is still influenced by 
a ‘patching up’ approach designed to ensure prevalence of the status quo (McCahery and Vermeulen 
2005). 
For instance, the elimination of the capital maintenance rules for private companies appears 
relatively easy. These rules, where the content is less important than their uniformity (Charny 1991), 
had already been applied to public corporations and subsequently were harmonized by the European 
Commission to reduce costs for third parties transacting with the firm.
9  Having served simply as an 
authoritative focal point rule for legislators engaged in company law reform, the decision to 
eliminate the rule for private companies – in light of the ECJ’s triad of judgments on free mobility – 
is hardly surprising as it could be accomplished without causing too much disturbance of existing 
expectations of the controlling and conservative lawmaking elite. In this view, the array of 
mandatory legal capital rules only seems to benefit several interest groups (Carney 1997). In fact, 
incumbent management may have influenced the EU legislature to supply provisions that limit 
dividend payments and share repurchases so as to obtain more leeway to reinvest firm’s profits. 
Accountants, who play a pivotal role in the required valuation, also have a substantial interest in 
exerting influence on the legislative outcome.   
But also members of the lawmaking elite, such as lawyers and other legal practitioners, seem to 
benefit from guiding their clients through the complicated harmonized rules (Enriques and Macey 
2001). Thus, since legal elites that benefit from the existing legal rules arguably have incentives to 
block innovative measures, reform-minded groups are confronted with the daunting task of replacing 
the existing legal rules with new measures and techniques.
10 Still, it is not surprising that bringing 
about change can be more troublesome than merely having to protect the incumbent interests. This 
partly explains the inherent shortcomings of this legal reform strategy.   
2.1.2  Increasing Returns 
This subsection surveys another factor of path dependence that is responsible for creating barriers 
that hinder reform-minded lawmakers from persuading the legislature to adopt effective company 
law forms. This factor of path dependence, which is generally labelled as increasing returns, can 
explain the survival of particular institutions and traditions that were once effective in solving 
serious problems in the business environment, but no longer provide strong support of lawmakers 
given changing economic and social circumstances.   
It is now commonplace that if firms use a particular business form more frequently, its value 
increases, thereby decreasing incentives to introduce legal reform. Increasing returns engender the 
standardization of rules and institutions over time (Kahan and Klausner 1996). Standardization, in 
turn, accounts for the lock-in to a sub-optimal framework.
11 The increasing returns approach 
                                                      
8   Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstryelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering 
BV v Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement GmbH; Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken 
voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd. 
9  For the most part, harmonized rules for legal capital tended to benefit publicly listed firms engaged in 
cross-border transactions (Leleux 1968). 
10  As discussed, the blocking power of the conservative lawmaking elite differs from country to country. For 
instance, the French legislature reacted immediately to the possibility of losing new incorporations to England by 
reducing the minimum capital requirement to €1. On the other hand, the German legislature, as we will see, 
which experiences a much higher number of businesses opting for the English limited, seems only to be able to 
agree on a compromise which lowers the capital requirement from €25,000 to €10,000. 
11   Bebchuk and Roe (1999) state that ‘rules might be path-dependent because the identity of the locally efficient 
legal rule – the rule efficient for a given country – might depend on the rules and structures that the country had at 
earlier times.’ corroborates the hypothesis that lawmakers are prone to inertia and inflexibility. The models 
pertaining to the appearance of increasing returns are often used to explain why the widespread 
adoption of products and technologies that become more valuable as their use (or the use of 
compatible products) increases could lead to a sub-optimal outcome (Arthur 1994; 1996). When 
increasing returns are associated with competing products, inferior products may prevail over 
products that are inherently better. More importantly, they may stand in the way of innovations.   
The literature points to the success of the QWERTY keyboard, VHS video recorder and DOS 
operating system over allegedly superior alternatives (Arthur 1994; Katz and Shapiro 1986).
12 Three 
related but conceptually different mechanisms are responsible for the possible dominance of 
increasing returns over inherent benefits: (1) sunk costs, (2) learning effects and (3) network effects. 
The end result is that if new adopters of a product or technology are only interested in their own 
benefits without any consideration of the effect of their decision on other ‘network users’, the 
development of new products and technologies will be impeded, thereby fostering lock-in to the 
inferior standard.   
Unsurprisingly, law and economics scholars have asserted that similar increasing return 
mechanisms help to explain inertia and momentum in the evolution of legal rules and institutions 
(Klausner 1995; Kahan and Klausner 1996).
13  Comparable increasing return effects appear to play a 
pivotal role, especially in the field of business forms, which could be viewed as legal products traded 
in a market (Posner 1982).
14 Consider, for example, statutory provisions and cases under company 
laws. In most western jurisdictions, the majority of firms are organized under the provisions of a 
corporate statute. Such statutes not only confer substantial network effects to users of those statutes, 
but firms also expect to obtain further benefits as new enterprises incorporate. Unlike the fax 
machine example, the use of the corporate statute could be valuable to a particular firm, regardless 
whether other firms have incorporated under the same statute. All the same, widespread use of the 
corporate form could have network effects analogous to those of the QWERTY keyboard. As more 
firms adopt the corporate form, networks of legal actors specializing in this particular business form 
(e.g., lawyers and legal scholars) will develop, thereby offering legal services of a higher quality and 
lower cost. Furthermore, firms may choose the corporate form to attract and accommodate investors 
who expect firms to use it.
15 
Learning effects further reinforce the application of increasing returns processes to business 
forms, including legal doctrines, statutory provisions and case law (Bratton and McCahery 1995).
16 
These effects, which come from the use of the corporate law statute, for instance, also explain why 
most of the parties that originally opted into the corporate form have an incentive to continue to use 
the regime. Factors that arguably add to the value of the traditional corporate form include avoidance 
of formulation errors, ease in drafting relational agreements, availability of case law on the 
interpretation of the statute, and the familiarity to legal actors (Clark 1989). If these benefits are 
                                                      
12   These allegedly superior products are the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK), Sony’s Beta format and Philips 
V2000 format for VCRs and Apple’s Macintosh system respectively. But Liebowitz and Margolis (1995); (1998) 
demonstrate that the evidence for the superiority of a particular product is weak and, hence, the extent of network 
effects may be much more limited than is commonly assumed. 
13   But see Gillette (1998); Lemley and McGowan (1998); Ribstein and Kobayashi (2001). 
14  Banoff (2001) gives an overview of the literature that uses the product metaphor. 
15   Klausner (1995: 785-786) argues that where information asymmetries exist and signalling is costly, marketing 
network externalities may exist. Network effects provide a purely academic explanation for the fact that US 
high-tech startups are structured predominantly as public corporations, despite tax disadvantages. Venture 
capitalists would rather avail themselves of the predictable corporate form, for which many contractual 
mechanisms have been developed and standardized, than rely on new customized governance and organizational 
structures.  
16   If, for instance, case law creates a legal rule that goes beyond the statute, such as enhanced fiduciary duties for 
close corporations, increasing returns derive directly from precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis (Hathaway 
2001; Rasmussen 1994; Stone, Sweet and McCown 2001). taken into account, newly formed businesses are likely to migrate to the business corporation statutes 
that confer these benefits to the user. This will mean that demand will be higher than it might be 
otherwise, which in turn will lead to the supply of standardized statutory terms, rather than 
customized ones that benefit a particular firm in a particular situation. Because standardized terms 
offer certainty (Goetz and Scott 1985), when advising their clients about incorporation decisions, 
business lawyers will recommend a standardized term – even if it is sub-optimal – rather than draft a 
customized term that could lead to a higher expected value for a client. 
The result of network and learning effects is that continuous use of the dominant business form, 
even if it is not ideally suited to some firms, will reduce the incentives for lawmakers to innovate. As 
in other areas of law reform, the reluctance to diverge from the existing framework means that even 
if new business forms were created, parties might be unwilling to substitute the standard form for 
non-standard terms. In short, the benefits that accrue to a standardized regime may be sufficient to 
outweigh the benefits that firms could gain by shifting to a new or modernized statute. Also, because 
potential first-users of new business forms do not have the advantage of future network benefits, 
such new forms may only emerge if the inherent benefits are of paramount importance.   
These ‘switching costs’, i.e., the costs of switching from a standardized form to a new or 
innovative business form, constitute yet another reason for conservative lawmakers to defend the 
status quo or only engage in patching-up reforms.
17  The uncertainty about the future benefits of the 
introduction of new legal business forms leads to the persistence of traditional rules and governance 
structures, and delays genuine legal innovation (Parisi et al. 2001).
18 Like R&D investments into 
high-tech products and technologies, initial lawmaking costs are partially sunk costs. In this respect, 
legal intervention is costly, not only due to the research, legislative and publication costs of new law, 
but also because various legal actors must invest substantial amounts in human capital and modes of 
operation that ‘fit’ the new rules and institutions. If the new legal regime proves to be undesirable 
over time, these costs cannot easily be recovered. 
2.1.3  GmbH Reform: An Example of ‘Patching-up’ Provisions 
In the context of company law, the ingredients of strong path dependence may involve externalities 
that lock firms into an inferior business form and make it very difficult for the reform-minded to 
convince the controlling elite of the merits of offering a new menu of legal business forms. To 
explain this, let us look at the current reform situation in Germany to see how resilient these 
mechanisms have been in facing off challenges to reforms that might have allowed firms more 
organizational choice. For example, despite competitive and interest group pressures to reform the 
German close corporation, the GmbH, along the line of the British Ltd., German legislators have 
largely resisted taking actions that would challenge the status quo. To be sure, proposals have been 
advanced to reform the GmbH in order to stem the flow of German firms using the British Limited. 
Figure 3 shows that in the first eight months of 2005 23,496 new GmbHs were formed against 3,195 
Ltds, which counts for fourteen percent of the newly incorporated firms. 
Nevertheless, economic and political pressures have not built up sufficiently to force through 
German legislative action that would involve substantial costs to incumbent groups. For example, it 
has been proposed that changes involving the reduction of minimum capital requirement (involving 
                                                      
17   Research in behavioural psychology has indicated that people in general show a natural bias toward the status 
quo in that they have a tendency to prefer to leave things as they are. Moreover, evidence from laboratory 
experiments shows that people exhibit a so-called endowment effect: people often demand significantly more to 
give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it, even when the transaction costs associated with 
reacquiring a similar object are very low (Arlen 1998). 
18  DTI (1999: 64-65) argues that in light of the opposition from special interests, professional advisers and network 
externalities, introducing a new statute is of no value unless it will be widely used. a reduction from EUR 25,000 to EUR 1), the transplant of the British wrongful trading rule,
19 and 
the option allowing firms to choose a single layer member-managed GmbH, would lead to a more 
flexible and lower cost structure and thereby overcoming the path dependence forces which have 
successfully blocked he introduction of a more market friendly structure so far.
20 The German 
legislature had a two-phased reform in mind; first, a compromise proposal should have lowered the 
capital requirement from EUR 25,000 to EUR 10,000. Subsequently, a more fundamental reform 
should have further adjusted the GmbH legislation to the social and economic changes. However, 
due to the change in government after the federal election in September 2005, the proposed reform 
path has not seen the light of day. The point here is that not only have reform groups failed to 
overcome the system’s barriers, but they have also failed to effectively alter society’s perceptions 
about the need for legislative change in this field. Major reforms that involve deviations from the 
current rules on the preservation of the share capital and the notarial deed requirement for the 
transfer of the shares are unlikely to find support in the near future. Indeed, in order to limit the 
increasing popularity of the limited, a new proposal to introduce a modernized GmbH was published 
on 29 May 2006.
21 The proposed act – Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur 
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) is built on three main functions of the GmbH law: (1) 
The incorporation of a GmbH should be fast, cheap and simple, (2) the new GmbH should offer a 
transparent shareholder structure, and (3) creditors should be better protected against illicit 
exploitation and rent seeking strategies of the owners of a GmbH. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison Newly Incorporated GmbHs versus Ltds 
Source: Adapted from Deutscher Bundestag (BT) – Drucksache 16/283 – 16.12.2005 – Auswerkungen 
und Probleme der Private Limited Companies in Deutschland. 
 
The reform measures serve to simplify the registration system, making a fast and electronic 
registration with the Chamber of Commerce possible for GmbHs. The availability of a public 
shareholders’ list at the Chamber of Commerce emphasizes the importance of the electronic 
registration as such an up-to-date list should help prevent the acquisition of the company from 
non-shareholders. It is the intention of the new Act to consider only registered persons as 
                                                      
19   The wrongful trading regulation requires directors to monitor the firm’s health and, if necessary, take some 
remedial or preventive measures that prevent their firms from sliding into insolvency. 
20    To be sure, the German legislature introduced a professional limited liability partnership 
(Partnerschaftgesellschaft) in 1995 and updated the legislation in 1998. However, the procedures involving the 
formation and operation of this partnership form appear too costly and cumbersome to economic actors. For 
instance, the Partnerschaftgesellschaft statute is linked awkwardly to both the civil and commercial partnership 
rules. 









jan-05 feb-05 mrt-05 apr-05 mei-05 jun-05 jul-05 aug-05
GmbH Ltdshareholders. In order to make the GmbH an attractive export product, the new Act proposes to 
abolish the requirement that the registered office of a firm is located in the same country as its 
corporate seat. Surprisingly, however, the upgraded GmbH would still require a minimum capital of 
€10,000 (see Table 3). Moreover, as a trade-off for the reduction of the minimum capital 
requirement, the legislature proposes to increase the managing director’s liability in the event of the 
firm’s insolvency. It seems that Germany’s lawmaking elite endeavours to secure the popularity of 
the GmbH by enacting a compromise legislation that mainly focuses on the relations of shareholders 
and managers to persons dealing with the GmbH.  
 
Table 3: Legal Characteristics ‘new’ GmbH (Germany) 
Characteristic GmbH  (revised) 
Legal Personality  Yes 
Management  At least one managing director   
Formation  Articles of Incorporation + notarial deed + registration at the Registry of Commerce + audit by the 
Local Court + publishing in a legal gazette 
Autonomy of Articles of 
Incorporation 
Some provisions are only valid if they are included in the Articles. Agreements and resolutions with 
effect for the future or that lack the agreement of all shareholders are null and void or voidable 
Notarization of Articles of 
Incorporation  The Articles must be recorded in a notarial deed, otherwise the Articles are null and void 
Fiduciary Duties  Statutory shareholder’s right to information/case law duty of good faith and loyalty 
Financial Rights  Shareholders have a right to share profits in proportion of their investment 
Transferable Interests  No public offerings allowed; a transfer of shares requires a notarial deed in order for the transfer to be 
valid 
Continuity of Life  Yes 
Limited Liability  Yes, minimum capital requirement of EUR 10,000 
Financial Statements  Mandatory disclosure 
Taxation Corporate  taxation 
Linkage Management  structure of public corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) 
 
The above example shows that the legislative inertia resulting from both elite and traditional 
rule-making as well as the standardization-effect arguably leads to strong-form path dependence in 
Germany, which hampers innovation despite serious competitive pressures from the English limited. 
The next section, however, will discuss how competitive pressures could instigate reforms despite 
the presences of considerable path dependence effects. It seems that the influence of high-powered, 
reform-minded interest groups is pivotal to the direction of change in company law reform. 
2.2  The Second Strategy: Responding to Reform-minded Interest 
Group Pressures 
The evolution of company law may well generate a new transformation if national lawmakers find a 
compelling reason to abandon the defence of well-entrenched legal forms and increasing returns that 
reinforce their position and block the diffusion of new innovative legal rules and institutions. Studies 
on the political determinants of legislative change have examined the connection between public 
welfare and legislative outcomes, calling into question the motivation of lawmakers to undertake 
reforms on this basis. Given this, the introduction of new company law forms in response to social 
and economic concerns would seem unlikely. Nevertheless, the recent emergence of new business 
forms strongly suggests the presence of some kind of incentive to innovate. 
A general implication for a broad theory of legal evolution is that lawmakers do not always 
dominate the lawmaking process. This is especially true of company law, which is influenced not 
only by lawmakers, but also by politicians and – more importantly – interest groups (Becker 1983; 
Grossman and Helpman 2001). To fully explore this phenomenon, this section discusses the 
incentives for the introduction of new legal forms. This analysis builds on the economic theory of 
legislation, which assumes that legal rules are demanded and supplied in much the same way as other products. Legislation ensues from the jointly maximizing relationship between interest groups 
and political actors. Promising political or personal support,
22 interest groups persuade political 
members of the legislature, and specifically those who run the supply and demand process of legal 
products, to pass or veto legislation (Tollison 1988). 
A key question concerns the identification of which groups of firms are able to lobby 
successfully for business organization law reform and the prospect of success. Within the economic 
theory of legislation, legislatures have no incentive to adopt efficient provisions for firms that lack 
sufficient resources to lobby for laws (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Generally, the legislature, 
consisting of risk-averse politicians and conservative lawmakers, tries to avoid innovations. Yet if 
powerful interest groups demanded that provisions of business forms be changed, political pressures 
within the legislature would attempt to satisfy the demand with beneficial legislation (Bratton and 
McCahery 1995). 
In terms of assessing the likelihood of the enactment of modernized or new business forms into 
national law, there are several classes of firms that might be directly attracted by the cost-saving 
benefits. The first class is made up of prospective firms that will only come into existence if modern, 
flexible and responsive business vehicles are available. For instance, it is expected that simplicity 
and low formation costs will not only appeal to firms, but will also encourage the formation of joint 
ventures and other combinations. The second class consists of future startups which would use either 
the traditional partnership or close corporation form. For the most part, these startups are small, 
closely held firms that would not consider the law ex ante, but may unwittingly fall foul of 
unexpected and disruptive rules ex post. The third class is made up of potential portfolio firms that 
will convert into the newer business form in order to have a chance of attracting outside capital. A 
fourth and related class consists of existing firms for which cost savings will accrue in the event of 
reorganization to a new business form, with the savings exceeding the cost of reorganization. This 
class includes professional service firms which, but for a limited liability partnership form, would 
continue to use a traditional partnership form. 
A wide array of business firms may deviate from the status quo to demand a new company law 
form. Economic evidence shows that only certain firms will have sufficient influence to achieve 
positive legislative results, either because they are more powerful than others or because they 
perform collective lobbying through a common body which gives them an advantage over other 
firms in the procurement of favourable legislation (Macey 1998). Small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), for instance, are not likely to play a featured role in the development of business 
organization legislation. While this type of firm could derive much benefit from legal changes that 
dispose of the cumbersome formation and operation requirements, information and organization 
costs arguably inhibit its efficacy in attaining its preferred legislative goals (McCormick and 
Tollison 1981). In the event of SMEs making the lobbying effort independently, they must first incur 
information costs in discovering the effects of the choice of business forms on their own welfare.
23 
Consequently, since SMEs may be severely budget-constrained in their ability to influence the 
legislature (De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001), they have incentives to join up with firms with whom 
they share common interests so as to lobby for legislation. The organization costs (i.e., the costs of 
identifying other similarly situated firms) must not exceed the overall benefits from lobbying. This is 
                                                      
22   Interest groups have several means of influencing the so-called brokers of legislation. For instance, they can offer 
hoped-for future employment. Another pervasive means is political support, i.e., monetary contributions to 
political campaigns and votes. In addition, personal relationships make members of the legislature particularly 
responsive to interest groups (Laffont and Tirole 1993; McCormick and Tollison 1981). Because politicians care 
about their re-election, they seek information on how their position on a particular issue will affect the outcome 
of the next election. As a result, it is submitted that ‘lobbying and information provision by interest groups to 
politicians is the most important factor in explaining governmental policy outcomes’ (De Figueiredo 2002). 
23   As small firms are unlikely to consider business organization laws, except in major relational crises, it is costly to 
ascertain the effects of different rules and provisions in advance. especially true if firms encounter collective action problems. Rational firms have incentives to 
free-ride on the costly lobbying efforts of others. Attempts to engage in collective lobbying will 
therefore fail if a few firms bear the entire cost, but receive only a portion of the benefits (Olsen 
1965). Additionally, even if small- and medium-sized firms can overcome these problems and have 
adequate resources to lobby legislatures, they are likely to expend their efforts on more pressing 
operational and special considerations relating to a particular industry. 
It can therefore be predicted that company laws will not adequately reflect the needs of SMEs. 
But even if this class of firms has high-powered incentives to lobby for innovative business forms 
(Bernardo and Welch 2001),
24 their efforts might not be successful. In terms of assessing the 
prospect of success, two factors may play a crucial role. First, legislative procedures and political 
processes reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. Legislatures have developed 
administrative structures and mechanisms (i.e., the political and regulatory institutions, voting rules, 
rules of order) to control the opportunistic conduct of politicians and legislators who are sensitive to 
lobbying (McCubbins et al. 1989; Schwarz and Scott 1995). As a result, the supply side plays a 
decisive role with respect to company law reform (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Second, although 
amendments to the menu of business forms would arguably make smaller firms more efficient, it 
may not be in the interests of other more powerful lobby groups to modify the law to allow new 
legal forms to emerge. Consequently, legislatures are likely to respond by failing to adopt 
value-increasing legislation.   
Consider, for instance, the notaries (lawyers who specialize in incorporations and are qualified to 
issue a notarial deed) who could organize themselves as a significant interest group, blocking 
innovative measures and frustrating attempts to effectively implement the easy availability of limited 
liability for small businesses.
25 In continental Europe, a notarial deed is usually required for all 
incorporations (see also Table 3). Given the importance that firms attach to the regulation and cost of 
market entry (Djankov et al. 2001), the extension of limited liability protection to partnership forms 
would preferably not require the issuance of such a deed. Yet, if a limited liability partnership were 
to gain adherence amongst investors and popularity with entrepreneurs,
26  the notaries’ fee revenues 
might drop substantially. If their losses are more acute than the possible gains of business lawyers 
who would be involved in the formation process of a new limited liability vehicle, the notaries will 
have a particularly high-powered incentive to block such a new form.   
That is not to say that legal professionals will not lobby for modernized company law legislation. 
Indeed the US experience points in the opposite direction. In the previous section, we explored how 
differences in legal business forms may persist across jurisdictions, and offered some predictions on 
the evolution of new legal forms. In interpreting the process by which business forms have evolved 
so far, we sought to identify the parties that help to set the agenda for the reform of company law, 
and which considerations have been instrumental in stimulating the recent instigation of new 
company law reform strategies that set in motion the shift away from the extant partnership and 
corporate forms as a business vehicle for closely held firms.   
This effect is most obvious in the United States where the relatively simple landscape of 
company law has changed dramatically over the last two decades. For instance, the LLP emerged in 
                                                      
24    Bernardo and Welch (2001) argue that overconfident entrepreneurs are relatively less likely to imitate their peers 
and more likely to explore the environment leading them to adopting new innovations. 
25   It might be argued that the persistence of the system of notaries is an example of the path dependence role of 
interest groups as a serious source of path dependence. In the 12th and 13th centuries, the function of notaries 
was to register long-term contracts, including relational contracts – such as partnerships. Apparently, the 
merchants used notaries when ‘reputation via word of mouth alone was insufficient to support honest behaviour 
and that a third party without any binding authority to enforce obligations was nonetheless quite valuable for 
promoting honest exchange’ (Milgrom et al. 1990: 6). In continental European jurisdictions, the formal use of 
lawyers as notaries evolved into a requirement to obtain legal personality. 
26   It is submitted that the developments with respect to the ‘quasi-partnership’ close corporation demonstrate the 
demand for business forms that combine the combination of partnership and corporate features (Ribstein 1995). Texas in 1991 to provide ‘peace of mind’ insurance for innocent partners. Thereafter, the LLP 
spread rapidly from two states in 1992 to all 50 states and the District of Columbia by 2001. The 
LLC is yet another, and more successful, legal production that combines partnership features with 
corporate characteristics. The introduction of the LLC bundled together limited liability, a flexible 
governance structure, and preferential tax treatment and also requires less ongoing paperwork than 
corporations. Also, it provides an almost total shield against personal liability without cumbersome 
formation and capital maintenance rules. In 1977, the first modern LLC statute was promulgated in 
Wyoming at the behest of lawyers and accountants acting as a lobby group for an oil company 
wishing to combine limited liability and pass-through tax treatment.
27 The emergence of and 
subsequent experimentation with the LLC forced the tax authorities to explain in more detail the 
distinction between partnership and corporate tax treatment, which eventually led to a new federal 
‘check-the-box’ tax rule. Under the IRS ‘check-the-box’ regulations, which became effective on 1 
January 1997, ‘unincorporated’ associations are taxed as partnerships unless they affirmatively elect 
to be taxed as corporations.
28 The ‘check-the-box’ regulations triggered yet a third wave of 
amendments of the LLC statutes, thereby encouraging the adoption of a wide variety of LLC statutes. 
Table 2 compares the LLP – as regulated in RUPA (Revised Uniform Partnership Act) – and the 
LLC – as it appears in the Uniform Limited Company Act and the Delaware Limited Liability Act. 
This comparison shows that the Delaware LLC evolved in the direction of a corporate-type LLC 
with narrow fiduciary duties and restrictive exit clauses. 
 
Table 2: Comparison US LLP and US LLC 






Legal Personality  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Management 
Decentralized  Decentralized (default) 
Centralized (opt-in) 
Decentralized (unless otherwise 
provided in the LLC agreement, 
the management is vested in LLC 
members in proportion to the then 
current percentage or other interest 
of members in the profits) 
Formation 
Informal by two or 
more partners 
Public filing of the articles of organization with 
the secretary of state (one or more members) 
In order to form an LLC, one or 
more authorized persons must 
execute a certificate of formation, 
which must be filed in the office 
of the Secretary of State 
Autonomy of 
Articles of 
Organization  Partnership: 
relationship governed 
by written and oral 
agreements 
If operating agreement is inconsistent with the 
Articles of Organization: (1) the operating 
agreement controls the internal affairs, (2) the 
Articles control as to third parties who reasonably 
rely on the Articles (the Articles must set forth 
only a limited and specific information, such as 
the name of the company and the address of the 
initial designated office) 
It is the policy to give maximum 
effect to the principle of freedom 
of contract and to the 





No No  No 
Fiduciary Duties  Duties of loyalty and 
care. Obligation of 
good faith and fair 
Duties of loyalty and care. Obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing  Access to in formation and records
                                                      
27   In 1975, lawyers and accountants advising Hamilton Brothers Oil Company devised the ‘limited liability 
company’, resembling the Panamanian limitadas. After a failed legislative effort in Alaska, they lobbied 
successfully for enactment of the LLC statute in Wyoming. In 1980 only, the IRS issued a favourable private 
letter ruling to Hamilton Brothers Oil Company regarding its Wyoming LLC structure (Hamilton 2001). 
28   The partnership taxation – pass through tax treatment – is based on the assumption that a partnership is a mere 
aggregate of individual partners who re-distribute profits among themselves. Consequently, LLC income is 
treated as if it were personal income realized by the members, and is taxes to the members as individuals. In 
contrast, corporate income is taxed first to the corporation and later, if it is distributed as dividend, to the 
shareholders individually. dealing 
Financial Rights 
Equal sharing (default 
rules) 
If no agreement, sharing in proportion to the 
members’ contribution to capital 
If no agreement, profits and losses 
will be allocated on the basis of 
the agreed value of the 
contributions 
Transferable 
Interests Generally,  no  Yes, restrictions are imposed by the Act, securities 
laws and operating agreement 
Yes, restrictions are imposed by 




Withdrawal does not 
automatically dissolve 
the LLP 
Withdrawal does not automatically dissolve the 
LLC 
Possibility to resign from an LLC 
is limited; resignation does not 
automatically dissolve the LLC 
Limited Liability  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Financial 
Statements 
No need to disclose 
records publicly; 
partners  
Members have access to records. No mandatory 
disclosure 
Members have access to records. 
No mandatory disclosure 
Taxation Pass-through 
(‘check-the-box’)  Pass-through (‘check-the-box’)  Pass-through (‘check-the-box’) 
Linkage  Linked to general 
partnership form  Some provisions are similar to RUPA  De-linked 
 
It appears that legal professionals, as experts in law with a well-entrenched position and 
proximity to the lawmaking process, have a strong ability to influence the legislature (Ribstein 2002). 
As noted, the increase in recent years of the number of hybrid entities offering limited liability can 
be attributed to the legislatures’ responsiveness to the interest group activities of professional 
services actors. Well-organized professional firms may lack enough choice to shield their liability, 
giving them adequate incentives to exercise political influence over legislatures to enact an LLP-type 
form.
29 In addition, innovative legal professionals who seek to design and implement new 
arrangements for their clients may have a financial incentive to persuade the legislature to enact a 
new business form.
30 If the existing menu of business forms does not satisfy a pent-up demand for 
firms to employ new and improved frameworks,
31 ‘innovative form entrepreneurs’ will endeavour to 
capture the market, thereby increasing their fee revenues (Banoff 2001). In the event of these 
professionals strongly favouring reform, given both types of incentives, the legislature is likely to 
respond by referring back to, and evolving from, existing doctrines and rules. For instance, they will 
bear in mind the key role of the notaries in the formation and operation of business forms. In fact, 
the current role of the notaries in business formations makes it likely that they will be able to defend 
the status quo, or expand their power in the future. 
The upshot is that the political economy of new company law statutes tends to reflect the 
compromise between the legislature and powerful organizations of professional lawyers. It is by no 
means certain that a new framework that meets the perceived interests of professionals is efficient 
and equally beneficial to other business firms, SMEs in particular. Nevertheless, legislatures are 
likely to allow these other firms to use such a framework without the value of corresponding 
advantages for these firms.   
To illustrate these points, let us consider the introduction of the LLP in the United Kingdom. 
While the decision to introduce an LLP was motivated by diverse factors, including election politics, 
which contributed to its speedy passage, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was directly 
                                                      
29   The professional lobbies could be very powerful if they are in fact the by-products of organizations that obtain 
their strength and support because they perform some functions in addition to lobbying for collective goods. 
Because membership is in fact mandatory, the organization can overcome information, organization and 
collective action problems (Olsen 1965). 
30    The role of business lawyers as interest groups is of course closely related to their role as lawmakers in the arena 
of legal formants. 
31   Since there is a prevailing view that tax issues play a crucial role in choice-of-business-form decisions, innovative 
lawyers are inclined to design statutes or combinations of statutes with a view to helping firms obtain favourable 
tax treatment. Section 4 of this paper shows that there are other choices of business form drivers, such as 
contractual flexibility and the autonomy of firm participants in structuring, free from court interference, the 
internal affairs of the firm (Oesterle 1995). involved in the establishment of the LLP. The DTI, which was motivated by the threat of regulatory 
competition from offshore LLP statutes, particularly that of Jersey,
32 promulgated the Limited 
Liability Partnership Act in 2001.
33 The legislation introduced a new limited liability vehicle that 
has legal personality, a partnership governance structure, and partnership tax treatment.
34 In drafting 
this legislation, DTI responded to the pent-up demand from multinational professional service firms 
wishing to transfer to LLP status.
35 Importantly, the reform-minded lawmaking elite, side-stepping 
traditional elites, exploited the lobby groups’ pressures to extend the scope of the UK LLP to other 
non-professional firm. In this view, the linkage of the UK LLP to the corporate law provisions, such 
as the requirement to comply with many of the provisions of the Companies Act and Insolvency Act, 
constituted a trade-off for gaining access to limited liability. Equally, conservative lawmakers made 
it mandatory that accounts must be audited to show a ‘true and fair’ view under UK GAAP.
36 The 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies published its Statement of Recommended Practice 
(SORP) on accounting by LLPs.
37 SORP confirms that UK LLPs must disclose their financial 
statements in line with those of limited companies.
38  Table 4 gives an overview of the most 
important legal features of the UK LLP. 
 
Table 4 : Legal Characteristics UK LLP 
Characteristic UK  LLP 
Legal Personality  Yes 
Management  Decentralized; in absence of agreement every partner may take part in management, however 
designated members have particular responsibility for certain statutory requirements 
Formation  Registration at Companies House on a prescribed form LLP2 together with a statutory fee – two or 
more partners 
Autonomy of Articles of 
Incorporation  LLP agreement 
Notarization of Articles of 
Incorporation  No 
Fiduciary Duties  No general duty of good faith; specific duties in the regulations to account for competing activities 
and use of partnership property 
Financial Rights  In absence of agreement equal sharing rights 
Transferable Interests  No public offerings allowed 
Continuity of Life  Change in membership of partners does not lead to dissolution 
Limited Liability  Yes 
Financial Statements  An annual return and annual statutory accounts must be filed 
                                                      
32   Limited Liability (Jersey) Law, 1996. Motivated by liability and tax considerations, British accountants (in 
particular Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse) provided a wholly crafted statute to the Jersey legislature, a 
largely passive and accessible body that decided to enact the statute. In speedily adopting the LLP, Jersey 
signalled its commitment to a comprehensive set of business forms for foreign organizations. However, high 
switching costs and doubts about the prospective benefits of incorporating as a Jersey LLP may explain Jersey’s 
failure to capture a share of the UK partnership market. 
33   The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, The Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, and Limited 
Liability Partnerships (Fees) (No. 2) Regulations 2001 came into force on April 6, 2001. 
34   The Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000 and the Finance Act 2001 provide that LLPs are classified as 
partnerships for tax purposes. 
35   In its draft Regulatory Impact Assessment, the DTI made a ‘tentative estimate’ that around 60,000 regulated firms 
might eventually become LLPs. 
36   There are exemptions from audit for LLPs with turnover up to a certain threshold. On 26 May 2000, this 
threshold was set at an amount of 1 million pounds. 
37   See SORP Accounting by limited liability partnerships at: http://www.ccab.org.uk. 
38   Initially there was significant resistance to the UK government mandating financial disclosure for LLPs. Many 
commentators assumed that the high cost of disclosure and privacy issues would limit the interest in the LLP. The 
Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations and accounting standards require that the financial statements should 
include, unless exempted by the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 as modified by the Regulations, the 
following items: (1) profit and loss statement, consolidated in the case of a group preparing accounts; (2) a 
statement of total recognized gains and losses pursuant to FRS 3, consolidated in the case of a group preparing 
accounts; (3) cash flow statement pursuant to FRS 1, consolidated in the case of a group preparing accounts; (4) a 
balance sheet, and a consolidated balance sheet in the case of a group preparing accounts; and (5) notes to the 
financial statements disclosed. Taxation Pass-through  taxation 
Linkage  Linked to corporate law provisions 
 
It follows that innovative change differs across systems depending on the organization of 
reform-minded interest groups, and the accessibility and responsiveness of legislative bodies. In fact, 
these features help explain the capacity of the US and UK legal systems to establish hybrid legal 
vehicles for different forms of business relationships and professional firms. The next section 
suggests that legal evolution is also not immune to exogenous shocks, such as social and economic 
changes, international competition and foreign pressures, which may be sufficient to trigger a new 
company law statutes. 
2.3  The Third Strategy: Responding to Exogenous Pressures 
In this section, we discuss how existing institutional arrangements may be called into question by 
economic shocks, increasing global competition or war (Roe 2006; Rajan and Zingales 2003). The 
large scale effects of these events can lead to reversals of expectations and consequently supply 
incentives and opportunities for reform-minded groups to create new legal rules and institutions. 
Even though there are few genuine exogenous shocks in history, it is generally recognized that the 
Asian economies experienced a major financial crisis in 1997 which, combined with earlier 
underlying weaknesses, prompted policymakers to consider altering the taken-for-granted 
institutional arrangements. A most conspicuous example of external-shock induced organizational 
changes is the corporate governance and securities law reforms in Japan, which were introduced by 
governmental regulators in response to the so-called lost decade of the 1990s.   
Japan has a long history of responding to external threats. Consider the period before the Meiji 
reforms when Japan was essentially a closed country and carried out only limited commercial and 
cultural exchanges with the Hollanders.
39 At the end of the Edo period (1603-1867), the Japanese 
government responded to the external shock of confronting new social and economic pressures of 
the Russians, and later Europeans and Americans, which attempted to establish trade contracts with 
Japan. Yet, it was only in 1854 that Japan ratified the Japan-US treaty of peace and amity forced by 
Commodore Perry of the US Navy. But, it took some time for the trade, which remained very limited 
until the beginning of the Meiji period (1868-1912), to develop. Foreign nations demanded the 
ratification of treaties, which provided for immunity for foreigners from Japan’s existing penal 
system. At the same time, these treaties granted foreign traders economical and legal advantages 
over domestic business people. In order to regain independence and dignity in their own country, 
Japan reacted, among other things, by adopting legal reforms, including a legislative regime to 
govern the internal affairs of companies, inspired by German law. The transplantation of a civilized, 
Western-style legal system was viewed as the only rapid and effective solution to force the foreign 
powers to abrogate the treaties. 
Thus, company law in Japan could be viewed as a German transplant (Milhaupt 2005). Despite 
the 1950-amendments introduced during the American occupation, the general corporate form 
(kabushiki kaisha) remained relatively formal and later reforms continue to show a tendency to 
transplant German legal rules.
40 For instance, the enactment of the yugen kaisha, a closely held 
business form based on the German GmbH in 1938, reflects the German legacy. 
Subsequently, radical attempts to change Japan’s company law system emerged in the late 1990s. 
In general this period is considered to be a ‘lost decade’ as Japan experienced a long-lasting severe 
recession followed by the burst of the preceding bubble economy. The Japanese economy was hit 
                                                      
39   The Meiji period (1868-1912) is known for bringing about the modernization of Japanese economic, political and 
social institutions.   
40  Such as strengthening the statutory auditors’ powers. hard as large corporations defaulted and banks suffered under an increasing weight of 
non-performing loans. The ‘shock’ not only hit the financial economy but also destroyed Japan’s 
self-esteem as a ‘technopower’. The weakening of domestic confidence, manifested in the 
involvement of the Japanese bullet train, the shinkansen – once a symbol of the reliability of Japan’s 
technological superiority – in multiple accidents in 2000, has become increasingly important for 
Japan. Moreover, large firm confidence was further weakened by the successful commercial 
strategies of European and American high-tech companies, collaborating through US hybrid entities, 
which have eroded the position of many Japanese technology-oriented firms. 
All of this raised concerns about the rigidities and shortcomings of Japanese law. The growing 
emphasis on institutional reform and change, in response to globalization and the corresponding 
competitive pressures, has been stimulated by a new constellation of interest groups which have 
significant political clout to bring about a variety of reforms, including the facilitating of stock 
options, to spur the knowledge-based sector and encourage investment.   
Besides traditional governance measures, policymakers have focused on creating hybrid business 
forms, similar to those developed earlier in the US and UK, that offer more flexibility in the decision 
making structure and governance framework as well as resource management mechanisms needed to 
support the efforts of firms working in the human capital intensive sector. Moreover, there are 
numerous indications that policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the concerns of the 
largest and most established companies seeking to develop new technology, spin-off new 
opportunities and intellectual property, and which can form the basis of joint ventures and 
alliances.
41 Thus, by 2003, the Ministry of Justice had established a number of priorities involving 
the amendment of the Commercial Code. The end result was a package of legislative reform 
measures, comprised in The New Company Law, which were submitted to the Diet in March 2005. 
Generally, the New Company Law (kaisha ho) abolishes the yugen kaisha (YK), the close 
corporation, and leaves a modernized kabushiki kaisha (KK) in place (grandfathering the existing 
YKs). The KK regulation is liberalized through the relaxation of the minimum capital requirements 
(reducing the JPY 10M to net assets of JPY 3M). Further, closely held KKs, which restricts in its 
articles of association the free transferability of shares, will only require one director to be appointed 
instead of three. The appointment of a statutory auditor for the KK is not mandated if an officer is 
appointed who has the qualifications of tax accountant or accountant. While a suitably modernized 
KK will surely attract a number of closely held firms, the legislature acknowledged that the 
amendments introduced will not be sufficiently attractive to those individuals or established 
companies that are interested in selecting a more flexible business form. 
It is therefore not surprising that the New Company Law provides for the introduction of a new 
company law form, the limited liability company (LLC) or godo gaisha. The LLC is a 
partnership-type form that bundles together limited liability, decentralized management by default, 
unanimous consent to transferability of members’ interests, fiduciary duties and no requirement to 
audit and disclose financial records. The Japanese vehicle bears a strong resemblance to the US LLC 
(e.g., voting and distribution rights are proportionate to the members’ contributions), but diverges in 
a number of important respects, including: (1) contributions to the LLC will be limited to cash or 
property, but no services, know-how or other agreements are permitted; and (2) the LLC will receive 
corporate, but not pass-through, tax treatment. 
                                                      
41   In 2002, realizing this adverse change in the competitive situation, Japan used its prior and existing Research 
Association for Mining and Manufacturing Technology Law (koukougyo gijutsu kenkyuu kumiai hou), and 
established EUVA (EUV association, 2002-2008) aiming at catching up to the EUV-LLC, but so far this effort 
has not born fruit. To worsen the situation, the US-European group has just initiated its stage by starting the 
INVENT partnership (2005-2012) to which IBM, AMD, Infineon, and Micron Technology have contributed 
roughly JPY 70 billion (about USD 700 million) which is also a closely held firm aimed at carrying out similar 
R&D activities (similar to the EUV-LLC) on technologies to form a super-fine semiconductor integrated circuit 
by using extreme ultraviolet (EUV) light. It may be that the adoption of a US-style LLC can be seen as the effect of a strong triggering 
event, which is the determinative force of domestic institutional change. It is difficult at this juncture, 
however, to be certain that these changes are only the result of such an exogenous trigger. Moreover, 
it is hard to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous pressures as the determinative force of 
institutional change. In any event, it could be argued that the sequence of institutional changes 
marked by the new hybrid entities is ultimately the result of both pressures. On the one hand, the 
effects of decreasing returns on key actors within commercial system, notably through the growth 
and internationalization of the financial system and the integration of product markets as a whole, 
actually influences the course of legal and institutional development, undermining complementary 
institutions and policies. Further, pronounced disruptions to the existing path not only altered 
intrinsically the interests of key pressure groups, but also modified their incentives to invest in the 
development of new types of legal institutions and rules. That said, the scope for both exogenous and 
endogenous pressures to bring about major structural reforms in Japan is evidently great.   
On the other hand, controlling legal elites and incumbent interest groups at first strongly resistant, 
regardless of the pressures, to adopt a business form that combines important attributes of the 
corporate form and the partnership form, such as limited liability, flexibility and pass-through 
taxation. In order to overcome resistance to change, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) stepped in and submitted, subsequent to the introduction of the godo kaisha, the Limited 
Liability Partnership Bill to the Diet in February 2005. As a consequence, the LLP or yugen sekinin 
jigyou kumiai came into effect on 1 August 2005 to encourage the creation of new business ventures, 
joint ventures and other strategic partnerships between high tech companies and research institutions. 
The LLP Law provides for the introduction of a vehicle that is characterized by limited liability, a 
flexible organization structure, pass-through taxation, and restrictions on the free transferability of 
partners’ interests. Despite these attractive features, the legislation mandates a number of highly 
restrictive and costly features including: 1) registration of the LLP agreement; 2) disclosure of 
financial information including the profit and loss statements and the balance sheet upon the request 
of creditors; 3) the mandatory obligation of partners to participate in LLP management and its 
operation; and 4) the right of partners to exit at will. Notwithstanding these arguable shortcomings, 
which reflect political compromises, the LLP may, as will be discussed in the next section, provide 
significant cost advantages to firms. 
Viewed from the perspective of an entrepreneurially government faced with exogenous pressures, 
such as global competition (Bratton and McCahery 1997), rapid changes in technologies and 
evolving market conditions, it is more likely to promote the competitiveness of indigenous industries 
through adoption of a cost-effective, reliable and flexible legal regime. If the future brings a 
substantial increase in business activity, a shift in interest group pressures for efficiency-based 
lawmaking could well be expected. Such a jurisdiction may consider entering the competitive 
lawmaking environment for the supply of law as product. In the company law context, a jurisdiction 
could reap the benefits by coming forward with a set of contractual-based rules ideally suited to 
closely held firms. If this jurisdiction would engage in a law reform process along such lines, it 
could very well create a focal point leading to a significant number of domestic and even foreign 
firms to select this legal innovation. 
Singapore is an example of an entrepreneurial jurisdiction. As a result of increased competition in 
Asia and the rapid development of China and the increase of Chinese firms being engaged in 
cross-border activities, the Singapore legislature enacted, among other things, an LLP (which came 
into effect on 11 April 2005). This evolution reflects ‘the acute awareness of the need to recognize 
and accommodate current international business and commercial practices’.
42 The Singapore LLP 
(S-LLP) is a new type of business vehicle in Singapore based on the Delaware LLP and to a less 
                                                      
42   See  www.singaporelaw.sg. extent the UK LLP. An S-LLP is a legal entity that can sue and be sued and acquire and hold 
property. Like the Japanese counterpart, it offers a flexible management structure and pass-through 
taxation. The LLP is a stand-alone business form explicitly de-linked from the existing partnership 
law.
43 The partners are not personally liable for the firm’s debts and obligations.
44 This protection 
shall not affect the personal liability of a partner in tort for his own wrongful act or omission. The 
internal relationship between the partners is governed by the LLP agreement. In the absence of an 
agreement or when the agreement is silent, the First Schedule, which acts as a model agreement, will 
apply. Although the S-LLP is required to keep accounts and other records, it is not necessary to 
prepare profit and loss accounts or balance sheets or to have them audited and disclosed. Table 5 
provides a comparative overview the revised and introduced business forms in Japan and Singapore. 
 
Table 5: Comparison – New Company Law in Japan and Singapore 
Characteristic KK  (new)  J-LLC J-LLP  S-Private  Company  S-LLP 
Legal 


















Registration of the 
articles of 
incorporation with the 
Legal Affairs Bureau 
(hômukyoku) – 











with the Legal 
Affairs Bureau 
(hômukyoku) – 




of the LLP 
agreement 





Registration of the 
Memorandum 
(subscribed by at least 1 
person) and the articles 
of association 
Online Registration at 
www.bizfile.gov.sg / 
Registration Fee is 
S$ 165 / Registration 




Yes  Operating 
agreement 
LLP 




Yes – notarization fee 
= JPY 50,000  No No  No  No 
Fiduciary 
Duties 
Directors must act in 
good faith 
Managers have 
similar duties to 







Duties of directors: (1) 
to act honestly; (2) duty 
to disclose 
shareholdings; (3) duty 
to convene general 
meetings 
Defined in LLP 
agreement or, if the 
agreement is silent, the 
provisions in the First 
Schedule (full 





Distribution of profits 
and losses allocated 
according to equity 
participation ratio 
(however, distributions 
of profits require net 
assets of at least JPY 3 
million) 
Profits and losses 
may be allocated 
at a different rate 
from equity 
participation rate 










Dividends shall be 
apportioned and paid 
proportionately to the 
amounts paid or credited 
as paid on the shares 
during any portion or 
portions of the period in 
respect of which the 
dividend is paid; 
Defined in LLP 
agreement or, if the 
agreement is silent, the 





Shares are freely 
transferable. 
Restrictions (by 








A private company 
restricts the right to 
transfer its shares 
LLP agreement – 
default: assignment of 
financial rights 
                                                      
43   See Section 6 of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005. 
44   The LLP may recover distributions from partners that know or ought to have known that the LLP was insolvent 
or the distributions caused insolvency of the LLP.   to board approval) in 










Yes – the Court may 
order the winding up if 
the LLP carries on 
business with less than 
two partners for more 
than two years 
Limited 
Liability 
Yes, no minimum 
capital requirement, but 
in practice some 
paid-in capital is 
necessary 








Disclosure of annual 
balance sheet 
No disclosure of 
annual balance 
sheet – financial 
statements must 
be made available 









Submission of an 
audited profit and loss 
account and balance 
sheet at a general 
meeting 
Accounts and other 
records should be kept 
and retained for seven 
years. No mandatory 
audit and disclosure 
requirements 
Taxation Corporate  Corporate  Pass-through Corporate  Pass-through 







Companies Act  Non-applicability of 
partnership law clause
Source: Adapted from www.singaporelaw.sg and www.jetro.go.jp 
 
The transformation described above provides a framework to evaluate the economic role of new 
hybrid business forms. On this basis, the next section will evaluate the new legal entities that 
emerged in the US, UK and Asia and are attracting more and more businesses to their relatively new 
network. It is suggested that these hybrid business forms, compared to the traditional menu, can 
provide effective choices for controlling opportunism while limiting transaction costs. Three 
fundamental questions will be asked: (1) whether closely held firms would prefer to select a new, 
redesigned hybrid legal entity, which sets forth the joint ownership structure and provides important 
contractual provisions in advance; (2) whether new business forms ideally suited to particular 
businesses are better positioned to offset the inefficiencies resulting from the lock-in effects and path 
dependence factors; and (3) how many products a menu of legal business forms should contain. 
3.  NEW PRODUCT SELECTION   
3.1  The Rise of New ‘Company Law’ Products 
The three reform strategies roughly lead to the emergence of three distinct statutory products. First, a 
legal upgrade arguably provides an easy-to-use vehicle that supplies lawyers and firms with familiar 
provisions that are ‘tried and tested’ and consequently offer learning and network benefits to users of 
the form. Second, a linked, but new, legal business form similarly holds out continued network and 
learning benefits along with the prospect of superior cost advantages due to better suited statutory 
provisions. Third, in contrast, a non-networked product holds out greater costs for adopting firms as 
switching costs effect prospective users negatively, and the absence of an established set of 
precedents – which are needed to fill the gaps in the inherently incomplete law – provide few 
incentives for parties to adopt an entirely new type of legal product. 
It would not be surprising that, given the relative cost advantages of upgrading, the first approach 
is the obvious alternative. A modified statute could be attractive as there are no new learning costs 
involved. Because there are usually few alterations needed, it is easier for practitioners and business parties to adjust to the new round of changes. Given that the changes are unlikely to touch the core 
components of the legal tradition and its legitimating features, parties will have an incentive to learn 
the new rules. Nevertheless, the upgrade model has been criticized for not only making innocuous, 
albeit necessary, changes but for being out of step with innovative social and economic change. 
Although the upgrade approach seems attractive, particularly if the existing statutory framework is 
functionally obsolete, it is unlikely to benefit users unless accompanied by genuine cost saving 
changes.  
Despite the apparent ease for jurisdictions to engage in producing statutory upgrades, this 
phenomenon has proved more costly and time-consuming than anticipated. This is evidenced by: (1) 
the difficulty in the design of acceptable upgrades; and (2) the reluctance of lawmakers to agree and 
quickly implement the proposed changes. Apparently, lawmakers when committed to incremental 
reform are less concerned with the pace and practical consequence of legislative change.   
Even though most jurisdictions still employ the upgrade strategy to reform, an increasing number 
of countries embrace a new product approach by following either the second or third reform 
strategies as described in the previous section. This can be seen in the cases of the UK, Japan, and 
Singapore which moved quickly into un-chartered territory when embarking on a new legal reform 
strategy that complemented their existing upgrade legislative reform approach. Surprisingly, this 
development seems better able to ensure speedy and effective legislative action. The length of time 
to develop and reform new company statutes is reflected in Figure 4. 
It follows from Figure 4, that it is probably easier for lawmakers to understand and appreciate the 
alleged benefits of the new forms across political systems. The complex tax and doctrinal issues that 
can hamper and delay law reform projects are more effectively avoided when a new vehicle is 
proposed which leaves untouched the existing company law framework. Reforms along these lines, 
moreover, are supported by interests groups due to the measurable benefits they yield, including a 
new business form’s (1) greater flexibility, (2) response to specific market problems and pressures, 
(3) ability to resolve conflicts between agents, and (4) value-added features in the structuring of 
transactions and business planning. Thus seen, the introduction of new legal products results in 

















Figure 4: Time needed to introduce the LLP  
3.2  Inherent Benefits of New Statutory Products 
3.2.1  Limited Liability and Pass-Through Taxation 
New statutory products often involve an optimal mix of legal and fiscal attributes (Thompson 1995). 
Empirical research supports the view that a new legal product eventually outweighs the benefits that 
arise due to learning and network effects (Ribstein and Kobayashi 2001). While there is great appeal 
to the utilization of existing frameworks, firms are now more inclined to structure their business in a 
framework that is largely free from legal oversight and allows experimentation. Figure 5 shows the 



















Figure 5: Total Number of LLPs in the UK  
 
Source: Companies House (20,000 LLPs on March 2006 is an estimated figure) 
 
 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 below show respectively the categories of businesses that have adopted the 






Figure 6: LLPs in Singapore 
 




Figure 7: LLPs in Japan  
 
Rather than the professional firms that the LLP form was initially designed for, there are 
numerous other categories of businesses which, due to a variety of drivers, have selected this new 
form. There are a number of common factors that induce firms to choose hybrid forms (e.g., limited 
liability and tax advantages). Limited liability is the most important attractor of businesses to the 
hybrid entities. Surprisingly, empirical research shows that, despite tax benefits, the emergence of 
the LLC did not affect the total number of new incorporations. It appears that the first LLC-statutes 
were not able to attract firms that typically incorporated (Ribstein and Kobayashi 2001). Observers 
questioned, for example, why high-tech startup firms chose to forgo tax savings by selecting the 
public corporation. 
Naturally, it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer, as the factors prompting startups to prefer the 
corporate legal form to other vehicles, is the subject of considerable controversy. Commentators 
have argued that the network effects and conversion costs, rather than the pass-through tax treatment 
and its lower tax rate, is the main considerations for selecting the corporate form (Bankman 1994, 
Klausner 1995). The reluctance on the part of venture capital-backed startups to choose the LLC is 
explained in terms of a preference to save on transaction costs and time in the course of the venture 
capital cycle. By forming a public corporation, for instance, they would avoid the costs of converting 
the LLC into the corporate form before an initial public offering (IPO).
45 Indeed, conversion to a 
corporation remains necessary as long as underwriters in the United States are loath to support 
hybrid business forms that issue equity interests.
46 To be sure, it is only to be expected that the 
popularity of the US LLC will increase when it becomes a more accepted instrument for initial 
public offerings. Even though the US LLC allows for publicly traded ‘units’ – that are nothing more 
than depository receipts for the owners’ property interest – the efficiency of selling units is called 
into question because underwriters are probably unwilling to employ ‘units’ on a large scale.   
Nevertheless, the popularity of the LLC in the fastest growing business segment of the market in 
the United States is increasing. Approximately 30% of the 100 fastest-growing firms in the United 
States are structured as LLCs. These companies are less than five years old, but their annual sales 
                                                      
45   Although the laws regarding the conversion of LLCs to corporations are usually very flexible in the United States, 
such a conversion could nevertheless, depending on the number of investors, be surrounded by cumbersome 
barriers in terms of finances and resources. 
46  See Bankman (1994: 1749-1750). Issuing interests to the public dissipates the tax advantage because most 
publicly traded business forms are taxed as corporations under section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code. exceed US$ 1 million.
47  This trend is to some extent driven by the recent tendency of venture capital 
and private equity funds, faced with an ever-growing fierce and global competition, to embrace 
complex structures that help optimize the financial results for each group of investors. The 
illustration below shows, for instance, how the pass-through feature of the LLC, in combination with 
a corporate blocker, could increase the options for fund managers to better tailor the tax structure to 
the needs of their investors. 
 
Figure 8: Tax-driven business planning 
 
Source: Adapted from Blashek and McLean (2006) 
 
Certainly, there is some evidence that similar flow-through vehicles, such as the Canadian 
Business Income Trust, Energy Trusts and Real Estate Investment Trust, are associated with tangible 
tax benefits that attract a significant number of firms.
48  
 
Table 6: Comparison of the Taxes Paid Under Different Structures 
 Corporate  Structure  Income Trust  Limited Partnership 
Entity Level  $35.00  NIL  N/A 
Investor Level       
Taxable Canadian $5.70  $14.82  $14.82 
Non-Resident $2.15 $3.30 $8.36 
Tax-exempt N/A N/A N/A 
Total Tax  $42.85 $18.12 $23.28 
Source: Department of Finance Canada (2005) 
 
While the Canadian vehicles, for example, can be employed more widely than in other 
jurisdictions, their enhanced popularity, compared to similar vehicles in the US, seems mainly 
related to the fact that an IPO does not effect their tax treatment. In contrast, US listed entities are by 
definition taxed as a corporation. A similar pattern would likely emerge if US tax authorities were to 
adopt the same fiscal measures. Such a development would naturally tip the balance in favour of the 
LLC since the possible benefits of incorporation, like network effects, would not weigh-up against 
the advantages of hybrid forms.   
There is already a trend which shows a high number of firms selecting the LLC over the 
corporate form in the US. The decrease in new incorporations is not only attributed to tax advantages, 
but also to the flexibility surrounding the formation and operation of an LLC as well as the higher 
costs associated with satisfying corporate governance mandates arising from the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
                                                      
47 See http://www.entrepreneur.com/hot100. These 100 firms had total sales of US$ 1.7 billion in 2005 and 
employed a total number of 6,920 people. 
48 Consultation Paper by the Department of Finance Canada – Tax and Other Issues Related to Publicly Listed 
Flow-through Entities (Income Trusts and Limited Partnerships). (Ribstein 2004). Figure 9 shows that the number of new corporations in the US declined while the 
LLC continues to gain in popularity.   
 
Figure 9: New Filings of Corporations and LLCs in the United States 
 
 
Source: 2006 IACA Annual Report of Jurisdictions 
 
LLCs are now widely employed for real estate and energy ventures, the exploitation of patents, 
corporate joint ventures, acquisition vehicles, and venture capital and private equity funds as well as 
high tech startups. As a matter of fact, the 2005 increase of revenues collected by the Delaware 
Division of Corporations – from US$ 612,8 million to US$ 626,1 million – is mainly due to the 
increase in LLC tax collections and filing fees (see Figure 10). 
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Source: 2005 Annual Report, Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations 
3.2.2  Limited Liability and Private Ordering 
It is a common refrain in the evolution of the corporate form that firms, in exchange for certain 
privileges, go through a number of formalities to incorporate their businesses, varying from, at first, 
the governmental approval of a corporate charter to the obligation to abide by the terms and 
provisions of the corporate statute, particularly the rules surrounding the separation of ownership and 
2004  2005control. Before the Industrial Revolution the privileges consisted mostly of a monopoly over trade or 
the exclusive right to act on behalf of the government in developing a country’s infrastructure. With 
the growth of commercial and industrial activity, the pressures from politically influential 
industrialists to abandon the specific governmental approval of a corporate charter grew steadily. By 
1890, the statutes providing for incorporation by simple registration prevailed throughout the United 
States. The introduction of a relatively simple incorporation procedure in France in 1867 had already 
resulted in the rapid proliferation of general incorporation statutes in continental Europe. 
In its developed form with fully-fledged limited liability protection, the corporation was the 
choice-of-business form for large-scale firms which were compelled to amass substantial sums of 
equity capital in order to give effect to capital-intensive industrial and technological innovations. 
The principle of limited liability was widely acclaimed as an industrial breakthrough and it took only 
until the late 19
th century that the corporate limited liability feature became available to smaller, 
closely held firms. In this respect, two legal developments could be distinguished. First, a separate 
close corporation form, the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), was enacted in Germany 
in 1892. Another, second, development demonstrates the importance of case law in furnishing 
smaller firms with the much-coveted limited liability feature. A decision of the House of Lords in 
Solomon v. Solomon & Co. Ltd overturned the assumption that only passive investors were granted 
limited liability under the Companies Act of 1862. These developments gained a widespread 
popularity across jurisdictions (McCahery and Vermeulen 2005). To date, most countries recognize 
a form of close corporation which, although they become increasingly flexible in terms of 
permissible deviations from the statutory provisions, is still modeled on the public corporations and 
its capital-oriented management structure (Lutter 1998). 
This raises the question as to whether corporate-type business forms, without the pass-through 
tax treatment (as discussed in the previous section), but with the partnership-type feature to devise 
the most efficient management and governance structure, would gain a foothold in the modern 
business environment. The answer to this question can be found in France. Recent data concerning 
the use of the French société par actions simplifiée (SAS), a limited liability vehicle that is 
considered to be the most flexible company form in France, which allows parties to freely contract 
into an optimal decision-making arrangement, indicates that not only tax, but also contractual 
flexibility is a main driver for business form selection.
49  
Table 7 shows the eschewal of tax as the driver for hybrid forms. Clearly, this runs against 
commentators’ expectations that tax considerations predominately explain entity selection (Ribstein 
1995). Obviously, the driving force behind SAS is the freedom of contract which enables firms, in an 













                                                      
49   The SAS gained popularity at a rapid rate in recent years. In 2000, there were only 4,500 SASs and 225,000 SAs. 
In 2003, the number of SASs took a big leap to approximately 100,000 registrations. The number of SAs declined 
to 160,000 (http://www.lentreprise.com/dossier/6.485.html). Table 7: Comparison – French Business Forms 




Soiété par Actions 
Simplifiée (SAS  Most advantageous 
Minimum capital  €37,000  No  €37,000  SARL 
Minimum number of 
shareholders  7 1 1  SARL  -  SAS 
Management structure 
3-18 board members 
(mandatory) – the 
president must be an 
individual person 
One or more 
managing directors 
who must not be 
corporate entities
Flexible – at least one 
president  SAS 
Tax  Corporate  Corporate  Corporate  SA – SARL - SAS 
Transfer of shares  Free transferability Restricted  Free, but Articles may 
restrict  SAS 
Limited Liability  Yes  Yes  Yes  SA – SARL - SAS 
Accountant Mandatory  Exempted below a 
certain threshold  Mandatory SARL 
Source: No 222 April 2004 L’Entreprise 
 
That said, the key driver behind the success of the new hybrid business forms, such as the LLPs 
and LLCs, is the concept of maximum flexibility and autonomy of firm participants to structure the 
firm’s internal affairs free from legal principles and doctrine (Oesterle 1995). It seems that, even 
though economic and path dependence factors prevent the emergence of complete law, the extended 
private ordering principles enhance the ability of business parties to experiment with these new 
forms. Businesses in need of debt and equity capital cannot therefore be expected to be tied up with 
corporate or partnership forms that only offer costly and burdensome statutory measures, such as 
mandatory management and decision-making structures (in the case of the corporation) or broad 
fiduciary duties (in the case of partnerships). This is especially true if these business forms – 
explicitly – fail to allow for the possibility to waive or contract around statutory rules and standards. 
For instance, the fact that parties may be subject to broad fiduciary duties, which may require a party 
to forgo personal interests, appears to act as a deterrent to venture capitalists and joint venturers.
 If 
parties are allowed to bring an action based on a breach of fiduciary duty when their high-risk 
gamble does not pay off, thereby circumventing the contractual mechanisms put in place to 
overcome information problems, the transaction costs arising from legal uncertainty and statutory 
ambiguity will increase significantly (Stevenson 2001). 
To be sure, a new hybrid business form has the potential drawback of being a relatively untested 
entity that has not yet generated a large body of case law and academic research. The fact that 
company law is inherently incomplete and the parties are boundedly rational inevitably necessitates 
the involvement of the judiciary in the resolution of intra-firm disputes (Bratton and McCahery 
1995). Indeed, it might be argued that new legal products only survive because the judiciary plays an 
important role in ex post dispute resolution and the development of legal precedent. Judges and 
arbitrators could, for instance, offer a solution to a puzzling and disturbing gap in the corporate 
contract, such as an easy buyout right for the dissatisfied partner, if the incomplete contract makes 
the minority vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the majority (Oesterle 1995). Empirical 
research indicates that new business forms create a new network of cases dealing with, among other 
things, the nature of new business forms, formation requirements, fiduciary duties, limited liability 
and veil piercing, transfer of interests, and dissolution (Miller et al. 2003).   
However, judicial gap-filling is not only costly and time-consuming, but may also be prone to 
error. Judicial intervention can create a potential judicial wildcard that creates costly uncertainty 
(Mahoney 1998). It is submitted that whilst intra-firm controversies are often observable to the 
exasperated parties, they may not be easily verified by a judge or arbitrator, and even less so when personal relationships in the family or between friends are involved.
50 As a consequence, many 
analysts think the judicial role should be limited, in the case of contractual incompleteness, to the 
selective enforcement of contracts according to their written terms. Given the spur for new company 
law products that offer the maximum contractual flexibility, courts should ‘permit persons or entities 
to join together in an environment of private ordering’.
51  In order to enhance legal certainty, courts 
should thus first respect the contractual arrangements. Only if both the statute and agreement are 
silent, courts should endeavour to fill the contractual gap by looking at the parties’ intentions ex 
ante.  
That is not to say that greater contractual flexibility will automatically lead to efficiency. An 
efficiency-minded legislature has the task to develop improved statutory default rules when 
enhanced certainty and guidance are needed. In order to increase the success of new business forms, 
legislators are advised not only to keep the statute up to date, but must also ensure it meets the 
coveted social and economic requirements over time. For instance, if the mandatory participation 
provision in the Japanese LLP entails problems for the internal stability of firms, the legislature may 
eventually offer new rules that are clearer and give better guidance on dealing with agency problems 
in a business environment. In this context it is worth noting that Delaware legislature strives to 
maintain legislative preeminence by periodically amending, among other things, the Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act. Table 8 highlights the amendments to the Act in 2003, 2004 and 
2005. 
 
Table 8: Amendments to the Delaware LLC-Act (2004-2006) 
 2004  2005 2006 
Number of sections in the 
amendment  15 18 38 
Amendment     
Freedom of Contract  7  -  - 
Clarification of Default Rules  3  10  6 
Domestication/Conversion 4  6  26 
Effective Date of the Amendment  1  1  1 
Other amendments  -  1  5 
Source: General Assembly of the State of Delaware 
 
The table above shows that Delaware frequently updates the LLC-Act to give maximum effect to 
the principle of freedom of contract and to the clarification of default rules. We should point out that 
interest group pressures mandate the introduction of amendments facilitating domestication of and 
conversion to Delaware law. If we take this point a step further, it is not difficult to explain the 
importance of the clarification of the default rules. Since the selection of business forms is a choice 
made ex ante, interest groups, e.g., business lawyers, have an interest to inform the legislature of 
shortcomings in existing provisions and provide technical support in devising amendments. 
As we have seen, the freedom of contract is a priority of Delaware lawmakers and in this respect 
it could be argued that amending the LLC statue into an all-purpose ‘contractual entity’ is necessary 
to confront the technological advances and the internationalization of the economy. There is 
something to the introduction of a ‘contractual entity’ that can be tailored to the business needs and 
expectations of each type of firm. Parties in joint ventures, for instance, are likely to reduce agency 
problems and contract into the preferred structure of their particular relationship even if business 
form statutes do not contain any default rules. Still, the function of statutory company law – as a 
standard form contract – must not be underestimated. In the context of non-listed firms, company 
                                                      
50  O’Neill (1998: 591) illustrates the artificiality of the family/market dichotomy with a US case, United States v 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), in which the Second Circuit surprisingly ruled that marriage creates a 
confidential business relationship. 
51   See 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari. law should first offer a relatively small group of unsophisticated – and often unmotivated – business 
parties a ready-made business contract. Second, company law should give statutory guidance to 
mostly larger firms that do not fare well when ownership and control are integrated.   
Table 8 reflects Delaware’s concern about emphasizing the importance of offering a coherent and 
consistent set of provisions. By continuously updating its legislation, Delaware signals to investors 
and creditors what they can expect in terms of the internal decision-making process and external 
representation model of a company. The foregoing discussion suggests that, given the importance of 
statutory guidance and the two types of governance structure – integrated and differentiated – a 
menu of business forms should contain at least two closely held limited liability entities, a 
manager-managed entity and a member-managed business form. As we have seen, this ‘new 
company law’ development is likely to occur more rapidly and with higher-quality results, as 
legislatures of more and more jurisdictions are realizing the importance of the role of hybrid 
business forms in transaction planning and structuring. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have distinguished three different positions along the reform strategy spectrum of 
company law. The first position is located on the left side of the spectrum and closest to stasis - 
where virtually no effective legal changes can occur and where only the idea of reform clashes with 
legal tradition and standardization pressures. An example of a jurisdiction that takes this position is 
Germany. Along or near the mid-point of the spectrum, company law changes are less impeded by 
tradition and standardization factors, but more influenced by interest group pressures. We see 
England occupying this position. Japan can be seen as a more adaptable jurisdiction located toward 
the right end of the spectrum and therefore better able to create and introduce more functional legal 
rules and institutions that turn the traditional view of company law around. It is submitted that 
Singapore is located on the right side of the spectrum as its legislature is aware of the need to adapt 
the legal system to international business practices in order to develop a distinct jurisprudence, 
acclaimed for its efficiency and integrity, which is set apart from the English legal system. 
As we have seen in the case of company law reform, the influence of traditional lawmaking elites 
on the reform process often leads to legal products that are out of step with the dominant vectors of 
economic and cultural change in society. Interest group and exogenous pressures can open up 
opportunities for reform-minded lawmakers previously blocked in their efforts to undertake 
legislative reforms. This does not imply, however, that reform-minded legislators will create 
first-best measures that satisfy the demands of users. Yet, despite certain inefficiencies identified in 
this paper, there are some inherent benefits for firms in employing the new hybrid business forms. 
Besides pass-through taxation, the hybrid vehicles offer parties the freedom to contractually 
establish the rights and obligations within the organizational structure. They combine the corporate 
feature of fully-fledged limited liability with the partnership law principles of flexibility and 
informality. In this respect, the ‘new company law’ ushers in a new era in which the statement ‘when 
in doubt, don’t incorporate’ is increasingly applicable to, in particular, innovative businesses. The 
introduction and popularity of ‘new company law’ in some jurisdictions, as depicted in this paper, is 
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